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LIBERAL THEORY AS A TOOL OF COLONIALISM AND 
THE FORCED ASSIMILATION OF THE FIRST NATIONS 
OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR 
JERRY WETZEV 
Between 1869 and 1985, the Indian Act presumed that once the Mi'kmaq 
of Nova Scotia could be christianised and civilised, they would voluntarily 
embrace enftanchisement. By 1949, almost no Mi'kmaq had volunteered. A 
Parliamentary review of the Indian Act concluded that voluntary enftan-
chisement as a policy of assimilation was not working. In 1949, when 
Newfoundland's confederation with Canada was negotiated, federal officials 
refased to assume their constitutional obligations to the Mi'kmaq, and other 
First Nations, in Newfoundland and Labrador, by not recognising them as 
Aboriginal peoples pursuant to the Indian Act. What the Indian Act had 
failed to accomplish in respect to assimilating Mi'kmaq people in Nova Scotia 
with their consent, federal officials attempted to make happen in 
Newfoundland and Labrador by their unilateral use of Liberal democratic 
theory. Federal officials asserted that because the Mi'kmaq and other First 
Nations peoples in Newfoundland and Labrador had been de-Indianized by 
their contact with white colonial society and because they had a theoretical 
right to vote, they could not be considered as Indians under the Indian Act. 
Federal officials applied a policy of "forced" enftanchisement for the first time 
in Canadian history to the Mi'kmaq and other First Nations peoples in 
Newfoundland and Labrador in 1965. This policy is still in force today in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Entre 1869 et 1985, la Loi sur les indiens supposa qu 'apres avoir ete 
«civilisi» et «chretienisi» le peuple Mi'kmaq de la Nouvelle-Ecosse 
accepterait le droit de vote. ]usqu'a 1949, aucun Mi'kmaq se presenta 
comme volontaire. Une etude parlementaire de la Loi sur les indiens conclut 
que la politique d'octroyer le droit de vote aux volontaires ne marchait pas 
comme strategie d'assimilation. En 1949, lorsque la confederation de la 
Terre-Neuve avec le Canada fut negociee, !es fonctionnaires ftderaux 
refuserent d'assumer leurs obligations constitutionnelles envers le peuple 
Mi'kmaq et !es autres Premieres Nations en Terre-Neuve et au Labrador en 
t B.A. (Ohio), LLB. (Dalhousie), LL.M. anticipated 1995 (Dalhousie). 
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ne leur reconnaissant pas comme un peuple autochtone selon la Loi sur les 
indiens. Les Jonctionnaires ftderaux voulurent faire en Terre-Neuve et au 
Labrador en utilisant unilateralement la theorie liberale de la democratie ce 
que la Loi sur les indiens ne put pas faire en Nouvelle-Ecosse. Les 
fonctionnares ftdiraux pretendirent que le peuple Mi'kmaq et les autres 
Premieres Nations en Terre Neuve et au Labrador n' aient pas pu etre 
considere comme des lndiens selon la Loi sur les indiens parce que ces peuples 
aient perdu leur identite «indien» a cause de leur contact avec la societe 
blanche colonisatrice et a cause de leur droit de vote theorique. Les 
Jonctionnaires ftderaux mirent en place une politique d'octroiement «farce» 
de droit de vote pour la premiere fois dans l'histoire canadienne envers le 
peuple Mi'kmaq et des autres Premieres Nations en Terre-Neuve et au 
Labrador. Cette politique est encore en force aujourd'hui. 
Whenever legislators endeavour to take away and destroy 
the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery 
under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of 
war with the people who are thereupon absolved from 
any further obedience .... 
John Locke, 1690 
In 1949, Newfoundland confederated with Canada becoming the 
tenth province. The internal political process among 
Newfoundlanders in debating and voting on the kind of govern-
ment they wanted exemplifies the basic concepts of Liberal demo-
cratic social contract theory. The process that took place in 
Newfoundland leading up to confederation illustrates the cultural 
values and norms British subjects in Newfoundland believed in, 
such as: formal equality-where everyone is entitled to an opinion 
and a vote; consensual, informed voluntary choice-where infor-
mation is available (in theory since many were illiterate) in print or 
by speeches so that everyone could make his or her own informed 
choice; liberty-where each individual exercises their personal lib-
erty in voting for the kind of government they wanted. 
Kathleen Mahoney has summarized the basic principles of lib-
eral theory that are the philosophical foundation of Anglo-
Canadian society in The Limits of Liberalism. 1 Mahoney sees 
Canadian political and jurisprudential thought evolving from John 
1 K. Mahoney, "The Limits of Liberalism" in R. F. Devlin, Canadian 
Perspectives On Legal Theory (Toronto: Edmond Montgomery, 1991). 
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Locke, John Stewart Mill and other liberal theorists. Five general 
principles arise from this philosophy: 
Because all human beings are equal, there is no justifica-
tion for any person or class of persons to exercise self-
realization more than any other. 
... because each person has the right to pursue his or her 
own version of happiness, ... no one else has a prior claim 
on any other person's activities .... It is wrong for the 
state to interfere with the conduct of the lives of adults as 
long as they are not harming others. Political freedom is 
a further liberal value because it operationalizes abstract 
individualism and individual liberty by allowing individ-
uals to decide best for themselves their own development 
and self-determination by choosing who will govern 
them. Each person must have the right to consent to a 
government or reject it if it threatens individual rights 
because freedom from arbitrary authority is essential to 
the individual pursuit of happiness. The purpose of 
democratic government is not to lead humanity to a 
higher moral purpose, but rather to preserve life, liberty 
and property. 2 
In his analysis of how Aboriginal rights have been conceptualized in 
Western legal thought, Jam es Youngblood Henderson looks at how 
these Liberal principles influenced First Nation-British interaction. 
Henderson's work looks at Mi'kmaq-British interaction in Nova 
Scotia from the colonial period to 1985.3 His work provides a 
comparative basis for examining the development of Federal and 
Provincial policy applied by Anglo-immigrants to the Mi'kmaq 
Nation in Nova Scotia and the Mi'kmaq, Innu and Inuit Nations in 
Newfoundland and Labrador in their on-going colonization of 
these areas. This paper will focus on the negotiations that took place 
between Anglo-immigrants to include Newfoundland as a Province 
of Canada. The jurisprudence of confederation, specifically that 
portion revealing how the Federal and Newfoundland 
Governments wished to deal with the First Nations in 
2 Ibid at 61. 
3 J. Y. Henderson, "The Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights in the Western Legal 
Tradition" in M. Boldt & ]. A. Long, The Quest For justice (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1985) at 185. 
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Newfoundland and Labrador, will be analyzed with respect to its 
reflection of general principles of Liberal philosophy. 
Were these general principles extended to First Nations on the 
basis of substantive equality, or were they applied to them in a uni-
lateral manner that only reflected the preservation of Anglo-immi-
grant interests? 
My analysis will attempt to illustrate the points at which the 
general principles of liberal philosophy and Canadian law could 
have been used to provide an opportunity for First Nations in 
Newfoundland-Labrador to introduce their own terms of union, 
but were not. Instead, the evidence will demonstrate that a preten-
tious policy of forced assimilation was applied to First Nations in 
Newfoundland-Labrador by the Federal Government based on un-
derlying assumptions of racial and cultural superiority couched in 
the liberal language of "formal equality." That is, First Nations 
peoples were "declared" to be equal within white Anglo-immigrant 
.culture. This assimilative equality was used to obscure the different 
rights Aboriginal peoples possessed. 
The British and Canadian Crowns had initially recognized that 
First Nations were nations of peoples with legal rights and interests 
outside the jurisdiction of the Crown in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763. The declaration of equality, however, was used by Federal 
officials to silence all questions concerning any need to investigate 
cultural and political differences between First Nations and the set-
tler governments. This new policy departed from the legal require-
ment, which the British and Canadian Crowns had previously fol-
lowed, that directed them to make agreements with First Nations. 
The assimilative policy of deemed formal equality breached 
Canadian constitutional law in order to oppress the political rights 
of First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador. Moreover, this policy 
denied First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador the benefit of the 
Liberal-democratic ideology of free and voluntary choice to de-
termine their relationship with Canada. Further, the declaratory 
policy of formal equality insured that First Nations people had no 
legal identity as Aboriginal people with Aboriginal rights that could 
be protected by the general principles of British common law. This 
policy enabled the Federal and Newfoundland Governments to 
confiscate First Nations territorial property while avoiding the legal 
duty of entering into consensual treaties of sale and compensation. 
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I. THE APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
OF COMMON LAW 
James Youngblood Henderson has reviewed the recognition of 
Aboriginal Rights in Western jurisprudence. Henderson attributes 
the evolution of four general principles of English law as being in-
fluenced by the liberal social contract philosophy of John Locke. 4 
His explanation for the evolution of the modern democratic state is 
consistent with the five principles Mahoney derives from Liberal 
philosophy. Henderson reduces Mahoney' s five principles of Liberal 
philosophy to two principles, the principles of order and freedom: 
Public laws were necessitated by the enmity of peoples 
competing for scarce resources and reinforced by the 
need for collaboration that marks social existence. Public 
rules placed limits on the pursuit of private ends, thereby 
ensuring that natural egoism and desires would not turn 
society into a free-for-all in which everyone and every-
thing was endangered. This was called the principle of 
order. Public laws also facilitated mutual collaboration by 
granting the power to individuals to choose the ends and 
means of their striving without interfering with the striv-
ing of others. This was called the principle of freedom. 5 
The need for order and freedom led to the evolution of democratic 
government and the development of four general principles of 
common law, structuring relations between individuals and between 
individuals and the state. These principles are identified by 
Henderson as the legal principles of tort, restitution, contract, and 
property law. He defines these as: 
The tort principle holds that one who causes harm 
wrongfully should put the victim in as good a position as 
he would have been in had no harm [occurred] .... The 
restitution principle holds that when one person has been 
enriched unjustifiably at another's expense, the benefit 
should be restored [to the victim] based on the extent of 
the benefit to the person and not the extent of the harm 
inflicted .... The contract principle holds that persons 
should keep their promises, and if they do not, the law 
should place the deceived beneficiaries of a promise in 
4 Ibid. at 196. 
5 Ibid. at 185. 
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the position they would have been in had the promises 
been kept. The property principle defines the relationship 
that exists between animate persons and inanimate things 
and then applies the contract principle. 6 
Henderson traces the historical development of the recognition 
of Aboriginal rights from the Papal edicts of the 1500s that were 
founded on the jurisprudence of Francis de Vitoria and 
Bartholomew de Las Casas. These Spanish jurists wrote that the 
"Indians" of the New World were human beings equal to 
Europeans whose rights and title to property should be respected, 
whether they were Christian or not. The thinking of Vitoria and 
Las Casas was based on the European conception of natural law and 
the underlying universal principles God had designed for mankind.7 
Later, European jurists, such as Gentilis, Grotius and Pufendorf, 
expounded on Vitoria's earlier writings, further developing and 
incorporating these ideas into the law of nations. 
English jurists, however, were intellectually unprepared for in-
corporating the New World reality of independent Aboriginal 
Nations into English common law which had been, up to the dis-
covery of the New World, inward looking: 
Struggling to develop a national law and preoccupied 
with the issue of where sovereignty resided within 
England, the common [law] lawyers had little interest in 
the law of nations and no theory or doctrines of law. 
Instead, they believed in the history and experience of 
the ancient procedures and formulas of the common law. 
The common lawyers believed all political questions 
could be solved by reducing them to legal questions and 
deciding them on the basis of precedent. 8 
6 Ibid. at 186. Although it is not completely clear what Henderson meant with 
respect to the operation of the property principle, I am assuming he meant that 
when a promise is made to a party concerning the protection or disposition of their 
property it must be kept. Prior to his definition of the property principle he stated: 
"The contract and property principles permit persons to make use of protected 
rights and advantages by enforcing voluntary dispositions benveen and across 
private spheres" (ibid. at 186). 
7 Ibid. at 188-89. See F. Vitoria, De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectionnes (1597) 
trans. J.P. Bate (1917); F. A. MacNutt, Bartholomew de Las Casas: His Life, His 
Apostolate, and His Writings (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1909). 
8 Henderson, ibid. at 191. 
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One of the initial English effons to deal with the concept of le-
gal jurisdiction over English settlements outside the territory of 
England was the decision of Sir Edward Coke in 1607. Henderson 
regards this decision as a summary of "fragmented medieval 
thoughts of the common law, which regulated private disputes 
among British subjects in newly acquired territories."9 Henderson 
summarizes the essential elements of Lord Coke's decision: 
if the inhabitants of a country conquered or purchased by 
England were civilized, their existing laws remained in 
force until altered by the sovereign or, after the 
Restoration, by Parliament. If they were savages or pa-
gans it was presumed they had no law, and English law 
filled the vacuum at once. If the country was uninhabited 
'desert', Englishmen going abroad to occupy it took their 
law with them 'as their birthright'. 10 
Henderson suggests that these principles evolved into three com-
mon law principles that vested the existing rights of First Nations in 
the evolving British law of nations. The Contractual Principle of 
Discovery, 
was a limited right in international law. It gave a jurisdic-
tional right to trade or to seek a voluntary disposition of 
existing rights and tenure from American nations .... By 
analogy and precedent, the common lawyers understood 
discovery to assert a 'perfectible entitlement' or 'pre-
emptive' right. 11 
Such a pre-emptive right is consistent with the principle of free 
voluntary consent. I would suggest that this principle also demon-
strates that Anglo-immigrants attributed Liberal individual "rights" 
to First Nations people, at this time recognizing a substantive 
equality and not an assimilative equality. In other words, First 
Nations were accorded the right to self-determination in trading 
with Anglo-immigrants. This is not to say that First Nations people 
were motivated by the same values and cultural norms as Anglo-
Euro-immigrants, but only that the immigrants projected their own 
Euro-centric conceptions of individual interests onto their dealings 
with First Nations peoples. 
9 Ibid 
JO Ibid. 
11 Ibid. at 192-93. 
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Trading was done at the individual to individual level. When 
real estate became part of the trade between Europeans and First 
Nations a second principle evolved, The Proprietary Principle of 
Purchase: 
Almost from the beginning of colonial expansion, British 
colonial governors in the New World had clear instruc-
tions to respect native land rights and to acquire territory 
only by purchase or treaty of purchase .... The propri-
etary principle of purchase flourished among the British 
colonists in North America. By 1683, the New England 
Puritans considered that it was far more important to 
hold the land under a tribal deed by 'fair contract or just 
conquest' than under English law. 12 
Here, a purchase of land from a First Nation, or First Nation's per-
son, was seen as being a superior tenure to an English Crown grant 
(if the surrender of First Nations title was not obtained). 
Henderson notes that in 1683, "the Lords of Trade instructed 
their commissioners to confirm all titles held under tribal deeds in 
Massachusetts." 13 First Nations were regarded as having sovereignty 
over their lands and the Liberal right to freely determine the 
disposition of their properties. This demonstrates that in the early 
colonial period English colonists recognized First Nations as 
possessing political rights equal to the English on two distinct levels: 
the individual to individual level and the nation to nation level, 
where each nation was accorded rights similar to individuals. 
Henderson sees this latter relationship further defined in a third 
common law principle, John Locke's Contractual Principle of 
Treaty Commonwealth: 
Native Governments of America were characterized by 
Locke as independent states under 'kings' or 'rulers'. 
Under this theo1y of the social contract, 'those who have 
the supreme power of making laws in England, France, or 
Holland are to the Indian but like the rest of the world-
12 Ibid. at" 193-94. Henderson is citing the Instructions to Captain Endecott in F. 
Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975) at 135. Henderson 
previously noted that the English term "conquest" did not mean militarily 
conquered. In English feudal law "conquest" meant purchase. His authority for this 
comes from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England at 1029-32. 
13 Henderson, ibid. at 194. 
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men without authority. This doctrine did not preclude 
American nations from entering into treaties with other 
European governments in order to create a more stable 
political environment, and it did not preclude England 
from entering into treaties in order to secure property 
rights from the natives. Locke called this 'treaty com-
monwealth' or 'treaty federalism' .... Treaty common-
wealth was considered by Locke to be distinct from do-
mestic consensual government. The major distinction be-
tween the two was that the former was a contractual al-
liance in the law of nations and hence was not a compre-
hensive subordination of will. l4 
The "social contract" between the British Crown and a First Nation 
would be limited to the specific purposes expressed in the treaty. 
Henderson contends that Locke saw the need to develop a direct 
treaty commonwealth between the British Crown and First Nations 
in order to avoid the assimilation of British subjects in the jurisdic-
tion of First Nation governments. If the Crown allowed colonies, or 
individual British subjects, to purchase lands directly from First 
Nations these purchases placed the purchasers under the jurisdiction 
of the sellor First Nation's government, according to Locke's 
Liberal theoretical principle of tacit consent. This theory is derived 
from Locke's view that an individual should have the right to chose 
who will govern him or her. 
The theory of tacit consent explains how a non-consenting in-
dividual "tacitly" becomes subject to the laws of a government to 
which they never consented. For instance, this can happen by birth, 
land purchases or ones physical presence in a foreign jurisdiction. A 
purchase of land from a First Nation was free of any duty to the 
British Crown and placed the purchaser beyond the Crown's juris-
diction: 
Direct treaties between the crown and American nations 
were the sole cure for the mischief of the prior purchases 
of native lands. A prohibition against purchases by gover-
nors and· subjects without expressed authority of the 
crown would resolve this problem in the future. l5 
This problem was highlighted in the Royal Instructions of 1761. 
14 Ibid. at 196. 
15 Ibid at 197. 
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In 1761, there had been numerous up-risings by Atlantic First 
Nations as English settlers intruded into lands reserved for First 
Nations under prerogative treaties with the Crown in New England 
and Nova Scotia. First Nations expressed their dissatisfaction both 
in action and representations to the British Crown's officials. His 
Majesty reacted by issuing the Royal Instructions of 1761 to address 
these grievances. This Proclamation was sent to Governor Belcher 
for implementation in Nova Scotia. In the Proclamation: 
... His Majesty acknowledged 'the fatal Effects which 
would attend a discontent amongst the Indians in the 
present situation of affairs' and asserted His Royal 
Determination 'upon all occasions to support and protect 
the said Indians in their Just Rights and Possessions and 
to keep inviolable the Treaties and Compacts which have 
been entered into with them'. More specifically, the 
Proclamation forbade the passing of any grants in any 
territories reserved to the Indians by treaty, and required 
the removal of all persons who had settled on the reserved 
lands. 16 
When Governor Belcher of Nova Scotia implemented these in-
structions by issuing a Proclamation reserving all the lands and 
coasts from the Muskquodobit River to the Bay of Chaleur, based 
on the long possession of this area by the Mi'kmaq, he was over-
ruled by the Lords of Trade.17 The inconsistency between the di-
rections to Governor Belcher in the Royal Instructions of 1761, 
Belcher' s faithful implementation of these directions, and the Lords 
of Trade's position, raises the question of dishonourable behaviour 
by the Crown. The 1761 Instruction was incorporated in a stricter 
and more comprehensive document, the Royal Proclamation of 
1763. 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 forbade the purchase of Indian 
lands except by the Crown. I would suggest that it incorporates 
Henderson's three common law principles of discovery, purchase 
and treaty commonwealth: 
the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We 
are connected, and who live under our Protection, [the 
16 D. Johnston, The Taking of Indian Lands In Canada: Consent Or Coercion? 
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre, 1989) at 10-11. 
17 Ibid. at 12. 
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Discovery principle] should not be molested or disturbed 
in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and 
Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by 
Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their 
Hunting Grounds .... And whereas great Frauds and 
Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the 
Indians, ... [the purchase principle] and to the End that 
the Indians may be convinced of our Justice and deter-
mined Resolution to remove all reasonable Cause of 
Discontent, We do, with the Advice of our Privy Council 
strictly enjoin and require, that no private Person do 
presume to make any Purchase from the said Indians of 
any Lands reserved to the said Indians, within those parts 
of our Colonies where, We have thought proper to allow 
Settlement; but that if, at any Time any of Said Indians 
should be inclined to dispose of the said Lands, the same 
shall be purchased only for Us, in our Name, at some 
public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be 
held for that purpose by the Governor or Commander in 
Chief of Our Colony respectively within which they shall 
lie ... [the treaty principle] .1s 
Thus, the First Nations were seen as dependent domestic nations 
within the "Dominions or Territories" which the Crown claimed, 
but were still accorded the power to determine the relationship they 
would have with the Crown through treaties. 
None of the terms or directions in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 suggest that the Crown claimed any right to interfere with the 
internal political organization of First Nations. In fact, there was 
implicit recognition of the consensual form of government con-
ducted by First Nations in the process by which agents of the 
Crown could purchase First Nations' lands. That is: "but that if, at 
any Time, any of said Indians should be inclined to dispose of the 
said Lands, the same shall be purchased only for Us, in Our Name, 
at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians." This pre-
rogative law evolved into a Treaty process in the 19th century that 
included not only the purchase of land, but the kind of relationship 
First Nations citizens would have with the Crown.19 
18 R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1. 
l9 In St. Catharines Milling & Lumberv. R. [1887) 13 S.C.R. 577, Strong]., in 
interpreting the status and effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 at 602-38, but 
particularly at 628-29, said it was the same as an Act of Parliament. Gwynn J. 
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Treaties of protection followed, enhancing the Treaty 
Commonwealth structure. This structure was repeatedly recognized 
in Privy Council decisions in North America,20 in numerous other 
countries occupied by England21 and in the United States.22 The 
treaties of Peace and Friendship the British negotiated with the 
Mi'kmaq explicitly recognized that the Mi'kmaq, as a nation of 
people, had a right to chose how they would pursue their own cul-
tural vision of happiness within an accommodative relationship with 
the British Crown as a "protector." The treaties promised the appli-
cation of the general principles of British law to protect their rights 
and properties in settling any disputes that might arise between 
Mi'kmaq and Anglo-immigrants. 23 
referred to it as the "Indian Bill of Rights" (ibid. 674). Strong and Gwynn JJ.'s 
interpretation of the Royal Proclamation was upheld by the House of Lords (1888) 
14 AC. 46 (P.C.) at 54. 
20 Henderson, supra note 3 at 198, Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut, in J.H. 
Smith, Appeals To The Privy Council From The American Plantations (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1950) at 425. 
21 Henderson, ibid. at 198-203. 
22 Ibid. at 200. United States v. Mitchell, (1835) 9 Peters 711 (S.C.). 
23 The Treaty of 1726 promised: 
That the Indians shall not be molested in their persons, Hunting, 
Fishing and Planting Grounds nor in any other of their lawful 
Occasions by His Majesty's subjects or their Dependents ... That 
if any of the Indians are Injured by any of His Majesty's aforesaid 
Subjects or their Dependents they shall have Satisfaction and 
Reparation made to them according to His Majesty's Laws 
whereof the Indians shall have the Benefit Equall with His 
Majesty's other subjects. 
The Treaty of 1752 declared: 
It is agreed that the Articles of Submission and Agreements made 
at Boston in New England by the Delegates of the Penobscot 
Norridgwolk & St. John's Indians in the year 1725 Ratifyed and 
Confirmed by all the Nova Scotia Tribes at Annapolis Royale in 
the month of] une 1726 ... shall be and are hereby from this time 
forward renewed, reiterated and forever Confirmed ... Article 
8-That all disputes whatsoever that may happen to arise 
between the Indians now at Peace and others His Majesty's 
subjects in this Province shall be tryed in His Majesty's Courts of 
Civil Judicature, where the Indians shall have the same 
advantages & Privileges as any others of His Majesty's Subjects. 
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In other countries the British colonized, such treaties eventually 
evolved into the founding of independent countries by the indige-
nous peoples. This historical evolution did not materialize in 
Canada, however, where indigenous self-government has been op-
pressed. Other previous British colonies where the self-determina-
tion and political evolution of indigenous peoples have been op-
pressed by the Anglo-immigrants include the United States, 
Australia, Hawaii and, until recently, New Zealand and South 
Africa. 
Prior to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the leaders of the 
Mi'kmaq nation had entered into treaties of peace, protection, 
friendship and trade with the British Crown. The first treaty was 
signed in 1726, followed by British treaty violations and the re-
newal of warfare between the Crown and the Mi'kmaq nation. In 
1752 another treaty was signed renewing all of the articles of the 
1726 treaty and adding additional British commitments, such as 
gift giving, to the Mi'kmaq at annual renewals of the treaty. Again 
the British violated the treaty of 1752 before all of the Mi'kmaq 
district Chiefs could consult and decide if they would ratify it. 
Warfare between the British and the Mi'kmaq erupted once again. 
In 1760 and 1761 treaties were signed between the Mi'kmaq Chiefs 
of all the Mi'kmaq districts in what is now Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland. The Mi'kmaq viewed these treaties as renewals and 
adhesions to the 1752 treaty compact. 
The Canadian Crown now claims the 1760-61 adhesions were 
new treaties that made the 1752 treaty compact void. These issues 
are now being raised in the current case of R. v. Marshall. 24 
However, the territory in question in the Marshall case is Nova 
Scotia. The Grand Council of the Mi'kmaq and the Mi'kmaq 
throughout Mi'kma'ki (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, PEI, Gaspe, 
Newfoundland and the gulf islands) view the 1752 treaty and 
1760-61 adhesions as covering all of Mi'kma'ki.25 
The Atlantic colonial governments disregarded the treaties, the 
directions in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and from a Mi'kmaq 
24 R. v. Marshall. This case is being argued now. The Federal Crown has charged 
Donald Marshall Jr. with illegal commercial fishing. Donald Marshall contends 
that he was fishing for eels pursuant to his treaty rights under the 1752 treaty 
compact between the British Crown and the Mi'kmaq Nation. 
25 For the purposes of this paper I only want to make the reader aware of the 
treaties as a live legal issue. .. 
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point of view, over-ran the Mi'kmaq homelands in Nova Scotia vio-
lating the treaties and the Crown's prerogative law. Instead of pro-
tecting the reserved territories of the Mi'kmaq, the Atlantic colonial 
governments, with the exception of Newfoundland until 1832, 
granted and/or leased Mi'kmaq lands to Anglo or Euro-immigrants 
without legal authority. The Anglo-immigrant governments re-
served small pieces of Mi'kmaq lands for the Mi'kmaq and encour-
aged them to gather at these spots so that the rest of the land 
would appear to be vacant and could be occupied by Anglo-Euro-
immigrant squatters. The Atlantic colonial governments then con-
firmed the illegal taking of lands reserved to the Mi'kmaq by pro-
viding the squatters with grants or leases: 
In their path to representative, then responsible, govern-
ment the colonial settlers in Atlantic Canada ignored the 
prerogative treaties, instructions and proclamations. Their 
goal was to have the same relationship with the Crown 
that the First Nations enjoyed. Through various devices, 
the colonial authorities replaced the prerogative order 
with one based on their own self-interest. When the 
crown refused to justify their instrumental order, the 
colonials transformed colonialism and racism into local 
legislative power, creating an alternative order that was 
valid only within British settlements. The colonial order 
allowed the immigrants to take the land and rights the 
crown had reserved for the Indian nations and tribes. 26 
Thus, the local colonial assemblies denied the aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the Mi'kmaq. Mi'kmaq people had to petition the immi-
grants' government as if they too were immigrants in order to get a 
license of occupation or a grant to occupy land in their own home-
land. 
In 1783, the colonial government of Nova Scotia attempted to 
dispose of any responsibility for the Mi'kmaq by making ten grants 
to Mi'kmaq groups along the rivers or bays they occupied. These 
were never surveyed and Anglo-immigrants soon encroached upon 
these lands, dispossessing the Mi'kmaq.27 
26 ]. Y. Henderson & A. Tanner., "Aboriginal Land Claims In The Atlantic 
Provinces, in Aboriginal Land Claims In Canada: A Regional Perspective (Toronto: 
Clark Copp Pitman, 1992) at 132-33. 
27 Johnston, supra note 16 at 13. 
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In 1820, Lt. Governor Dalhousie initiated a plan to develop a 
comprehensive reserve system. The Province was divided into 10 
regions with a one thousand acre reserve in each region. This plan 
also failed. The reserves were never surveyed, Anglo-immigrants 
again squatted on them and the government refused to remove the 
squatters. Another plan was enacted by legislation in 1842 called An 
Act to provide for the Instruction and Permanent Settlement of the 
lndians. 28 For the first time a government official was appointed to 
supervise and manage all lands reserved for the Mi'kmaq people. 
He was also to protect the land from non-Mi'kmaq squatters.29 The 
various Nova Scotia Commissioners of Indian Affairs did little to 
dislodge the squatters, however. In 1866, shortly before confed-
eration, Nova Scotia Indian Commissioner Fairbanks, in his final 
report, estimated that there were between 1400-1800 Mi'kmaq in 
the entire province and that 20,730 acres ofland had been set aside 
as reserves, although this figure did not account for the reserve 
lands that were being squatted on by Anglo-immigrants.30 
It is important to note that up to this point neither the Imperial 
Government nor the Government of Nova Scotia attempted to 
legislatively interfere in the internal self-government of the 
Mi'kmaq people in Nova Scotia. This would drastically change un-
der the Government of Canada and the Indian Act. 
The English colonial period in Nova Scotia appears to have been 
a time when the assimilation of the Mi'kmaq was not an explicit 
part of government policy. The colonial government had no orga-
nized plan to transform the Mi'kmaq into farmers, or engage them 
in other Anglo vocations. Rather, the actions of the Nova Scotia 
Government suggest that what it wanted to do was curtail the sea-
sonal pattern of movement between different resource areas that the 
Mi'kmaq people used. The setting aside of reserves was supposed to 
settle the Mi'kmaq and remove the possibility of confrontations 
with Anglo-immigrants who were exploiting Mi'kmaq resources. 
The de-construction of the social and political structure of the 
Mi'kmaq by the colonial government was not an explicit govern-
ment policy. However, this is not to say that Mi'kmaq society had 
not been changed by the efforts of the missionaries over the years. 
Mi'kmaq values were mixed with Catholic beliefs. Still, the Grand 
28 S.N.S. 1842, c. 16. 
29 Johnstone, supra note 16 at 14. 
30 Ibid. at 17. 
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Council of the Mi'kmaq continued to function along side the tra-
ditional extended family order that dictated internal relations and 
when and where the family would move on their seasonal rounds. 
Thus, up to the time of confederation, the Colonial 
Government of Nova Scotia did not want to assimilate the 
Mi'kmaq as formal equals. The settlers' government used its legal 
powers to push the Mi'kmaq out of the way while it usurped re-
served Mi'kmaq lands. Once the Mi'kmaq were no longer a mili-
tary threat to the English, the promises of protection under English 
law, with the built in philosophy of individual rights, and the im-
plicit recognition of substantive equality in His Majesty's court, fell 
by the way side. 
II. NOVA SCOTIA'S CONFEDERATION WITH 
CANADA AND THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIAN 
ACTTO THE MI'KMAQ OF NOVA SCOTIA 
While colonial legislation was sparse and directed at the establish-
ment of reserves in the Atlantic colonies, some legislation directly 
interfering in the internal workings of First Nations had been 
passed in Upper and Lower Canada by the Imperial administration. 
England had administered Indian Affairs until 1860 in Upper and 
Lower Canada. The British administrators had decided that since 
the Indians were no longer needed as British allies against American 
expansionism the best idea would be to "civilize" them by encour-
aging them to accept British culture. Thus began the British policy 
of assimilation.31 
In 1857, the Act to Encourage the gradual Civilization of the 
Indian Tribes in this Province32 was passed. This was the first Act to 
contemplate the de-construction of a person's aboriginal identity. 
The Act provided that any adult male Indian who was of good 
character, with no debts, who was fluent in either English or French, 
would be eligible for full citizenship through "enfranchisement," 
that is they would be legally considered as a non-Indian. In theory, 
Indians would then enjoy equality and all the other democratic lib-
eral privileges along with other Canadian citizens. Any Indian who 
3! E. B. Tidey, A Narrow Vision (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1986) at 3-5. 
32 S. Prov. C. 1857, c. 26. 
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successfully satisfied these requirements would be given up to fifty 
acres of land and his share of his Band's funds. 33 These laws were 
adopted by the Federal Government carte blanche after 
Confederation. 
In 1867, the British Parliament passed the British North America 
Act (hereinafter BNA Act). 34 Section 91 (24) delegated the Imperial 
Crown's responsibility for Indians and lands reserved for Indians to 
the Federal Government of Canada. The Federal Government took 
responsibility for the management of Indians and Indian lands in 
Nova Scotia. It empowered itself to do this by passing An Act 
providing far the organization of the Department of the Secretary of 
State of Canada, and far the management of Indian and Ordnance 
Lands.35 Existing colonial Indian legislation was confirmed by the 
new federal government. 
The Federal Government in Nova Scotia, not being subject to 
the exclusive tyranny of the electors in the province, moved against 
white squatters and removed them from reserve lands, unlike the 
accommodative policy the Nova Scotia colonial government had 
pursued.36 After an initial period of removing squatters from reserve 
lands in the Atlantic Provinces, the Federal policy changed. The 
growth of cities in the Atlantic area and the larger reserves set aside 
under treaties in the prairies created demands by whites to remove 
Indians from reserves near growing white towns or to lease out 
"unused" reserve lands to non-Indians. The Federal Government 
implemented these demands by amending the Indian Act 37 in 
1919, making the dispossession of First Nations from their reserves 
possible without their consent, via the infamous section 49A.38 
33 Tidey, supra note 31 at 4. 
34 Constitution Act 1867, (U.K.) 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 .. 
35 s.c. 1868, c. 42. 
36 R. H. Bartlett, Indian Reserves In the Atlantic Provinces of Canada (Saskatoon: 
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1986) at 20-23. 
37 S.C. 1911, c. 14. s.2. 
3S Bartlett, supra note 36 at 26-27, citing S.C. 1911, c. 14, s. 2. Section 49A reads: 
In the case of an Indian Reserve that adjoins or is situated wholly 
or partly within an incorporated town or city having a 
population of not less than eight thousand, and which reserve has 
not been released or surrendered by the Indians, the Governor in 
Council may, upon the recommendation of the Superintendent 
General, refer to the judge of the Exchequer Court of Canada 
for inquiry and report the question as to whether it is expedient, 
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This section of the Act was used to remove the Mi'kmaq from 
their Kings' Road reserve in Sydney, Nova Scotia in 1915, because 
the Mi'kmaq people and their reserve were inferior beings: 
Now, this Reserve abuts on King's Road, which is one of 
the principal arteries of the city, a highway very much 
travelled and used by the public, and upon which a large 
number of fine residences are built. No one cares to live 
in the immediate vicinity of the Indians. The overwhelm -
ing weight of the evidence is to the effect that the 
Reserve retards and is a clog in the development of that 
part of the city .... The removal would make the prop-
erty in that neighbourhood more valuable for assessment 
purposes .... The racial inequalities of the Indians, as 
compared with the white man, check to a great extent 
any move towards social development, a state of affairs 
which, under the system now obtaining, can only grow 
worse every day, as the number oflndians is increasing.39 
Thus, it was the interests of the white English public and their 
Liberal right to "pursue their own version of happiness" that was 
recognized. The state intervened on behalf of white interests. This 
intervention disregarded the interest of the Mi'kmaq in continuing 
having regard to the interest of the public and the Indians of the 
band for whose use the reserve is held, that the Indians should be 
removed from the reserve or any part of it. 
This section of the Act was developed after Parliament had to pass a special act to 
expropriate the Songhee's Reserve in Victoria, B.C .. The Songhee Band would not 
voluntarily surrender their ancestral lands and the Indian Act provided them with 
unintended protection. In proposing this amendment to Parliament the Minister of 
Indian Affairs stated: 
For while we believe that the Indian, having a certain treaty 
right, is entitled ordinarily to stand upon that right and get the 
benefit of it, yet we believe also that there are certain 
circumstances and conditions in which the Indian by standing on 
his treaty rights does himself an ultimate injury as well as does an 
injury to the white people, whose interests are brought into 
immediate conjunction with the interests of the Indians (House 
of Commons Debates, vol. IV, 3d sess., 11th Par!. 1-2 Geo.V, 
1910-11, at 7827, per Frank Oliver, M.P.) 
39 Re Indian Reserve, City of Sydney, Nova Scotia (1916), 42 D.L.R. 314 (Ex. Ct.) 
at 316-17. 
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to live at their traditional village at the mouth of the river in Sydney 
harbour which had been reserved to them by law. 
The presence of the Mi'kmaq triggered the "harm" principle. 
The Mi'kmaq were "a clog in the development of the city" and thus 
"harmed" the pursuit of commercial development by the white 
folk. The Court, and the Federal Government, both obviously be-
lieved that Mi'kmaq were not to be accorded similar individual 
rights to pursue their traditional economic activities, or "happiness." 
"The racial inequalities of the Indians ... check ... any move to-
wards social development." 
The Indian Act also provided unintended protection for First 
Nations' interests by requiring the consent of the majority of First 
Nation residents on a reserve to approve any surrender of reserve 
lands. Section 49A, however, removed this recognition of First 
Nations' right to determine what was in their best interest. The 
amendment insured that when Indian interests in land conflicted · 
with white interests, white interests would come first in law. Equal 
benefit of the general liberal principle of voluntary consent was de-
nied to the Mi'kmaq. Thus, the court in Re Indian Reserve could in-
voke immigrant statute law that prevented the general principles of 
common law from protecting Mi'kmaq property interests. Law was 
created that was explicitly based on assumptions of the racial and 
cultural superiority of white interests. 
Other sections of the Indian Act 40 also directly attacked First 
Nations' control of their identity, community, government and 
education. These sections of the Act oppress any expression of in-
dividual liberal-like rights of First Nations people to liberty (being 
able to live a traditional Mi'kmaq way of life), the pursuit of happi-
ness, and consensual government. 
Section 2 of the Indian Act declares that an Indian is a person 
"who pursuant to this Act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to 
be registered as an Indian." Under section 6 of the current Act, a 
person entitled to be registered as an Indian is any person who was 
previously entitled to be registered before April 17, 1985, or omit-
ted from the Indian Register before or after September 4, 19 51, 41 
40 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
41 These dates denote when Indian women began to be removed from Band lists 
because they married non-Indians or non-status Indians. The date of 17 April 1985 
ensures that non-Indian women who were married to an Indian, or a person 
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or any person who is a member of a body of persons that has been 
declared by the Governor in Council to be a Band for the purpose 
of the Act. These sections empower the Federal Government to 
identify who is Indian and who is not. This strikes at the most basic 
level of First Nations self-determination, the right of individuals to 
define themselves politically and culturally. 
This section of the Act denied the Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq the 
individual and societal right to define their personhood and them-
selves as a nation of peoples. The Federal government has also uti-
lized this power to terminate the legal existence of thousands of 
Mi'kmaq women and children in Nova Scotia. If a Mi'kmaq 
woman married a non-Indian or non-status Indian, she, and any 
subsequent children of the marriage, were involuntarily enfran-
chised. By comparison, if a white Canadian women married some-
one who did not have Canadian citizenship she was not forced to 
accept her spouse's political and cultural identity and lose her 
Canadian citizenship. Instead, if the non-Canadian spouse resided 
in Canada he was able to become a Canadian citizen. A Canadian 
citizen could only lose their citizenship by voluntarily renouncing it. 
In addition, section 17(1) of the Indian Act empowers the 
Minister of Indian Affairs to create new Indian bands, split or 
amalgamate old ones, and extinguish the legal existence of a Band 
through the enfranchisement of whole Bands. 
In 1951, the Minister oflndian Affairs used this power to uni-
laterally split the Mi'kmaq nation in Nova Scotia into eleven sepa-
rate bands.42 Formerly, all Mi'kmaq people in Nova Scotia were 
considered one Band and the traditional Grand Chief of the 
Mi'kmaq was considered the head of the Nova Scotia Mi'kmaq 
Band by federal authorities. The division of the Nova Scotia 
Mi'kmaq into eleven bands attacked the political, cultural, spiritual 
structure of Mi'kmaq society, the individual rights of Mi'kmaq to 
choose who would govern them and whose rules would be used in 
governing. This section empowered the Federal Government to 
impose its vision of political, cultural, and spiritual norms on the 
Mi'kmaq community. It gave Federal bureaucrats the power to 
withhold Liberal individual rights that would have provided 
Mi'kmaq people with the opportunity to choose between their tra-
entitled to be registered as an Indian, retain the right to be registered "as if they 
were Indians." 
42 Bartlett, supra note 36 at 29. 
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ditional vision of community and the Anglo-immigrant vision of 
community. 
Sections 114-122 are the most destructive sections of the Indian 
Act with respect to the maintenance of Mi'kmaq culture and values. 
These sections empower the Minister of Indian Affairs to force First 
Nations children to attend Anglo-schools that indoctrinate First 
Nations children in the racist history and ideology of the colonial 
immigrants. It teaches only one language, English. It awards the 
minds of First Nations children to whichever Euro-christian de-
nomination claims the right to spiritually colonize a First Nation. 
These sections have made it impossible for grandparents to coher-
ently pass on their language and culture to their grandchildren.43 
These sections of the Act enabled the Minister of Indian Affairs, be-
tween 1940-1970, to take Mi'kmaq children from their families 
and communities and to put them in Catholic Boarding Schools in 
Nova Scotia. In these foreign institutions, Mi'kmaq children were 
punished for practising the Mi'kmaq language and subjected to 
mental, physical and, in many cases, to sexual abuse. 44 This pro-
gram has inflicted immeasurable injury on these children, now 
adults, who experienced this trauma. 
This program withheld from Mi'kmaq parents the Liberal indi-
vidual right of personal liberty to determine the kind of education 
their children would receive. Federal officials saw a traditional 
Mi'kmaq education as being "harmful" to their plan of assimilating 
Mi'kmaq children, thus justifying the use of force used to take 
Mi'kmaq children from their families and communities and to 
place them in boarding schools. Federal officials made individual 
decisions on what the "best interests" of the children were. They 
imposed their own liberty of choice in place of the Mi'kmaq parents 
right to choose how to educate their children. 
The denial of the equal Liberal rights for Mi'kmaq people by 
the Nova Scotia and Federal Governments was mitigated to some 
extent by the Indian Act. Reserves were special zones. The 
Government created them as transitional areas for assimilation, but 
43 In Mi'kmaq communities the grandparents were the teachers for their 
grandchildren. Oral history of their families, their hunting territories, how to hunt 
different animals at different places at different times of the year, of exciting events 
in their lives, of the right thing to do in different circumstances and information 
about many other things were passed from grandparent to grandchildren. 
44 I. T.S. Knockwood, Out of the Depths (Lockeport: Roseway Publishing, 1992). 
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First Nations used them to undermine the objective of the Act.45 As 
long as Mi'kmaq people did not voluntarily enfranchise themselves, 
remained on the reserve, and did not allow themselves to appear to 
be a candidate for involuntary enfranchisement, they were able to 
maintain some elements of the Mi'kmaq vision of community, 
language, and culture. By doing so, it could be argued that they 
were exercising the Liberal right to pursue their own vision of 
liberty and individual happiness. However, the opportunities for 
Mi'kmaq people to preserve their culture and values were limited. 
The assimilation objective of the Federal Government was perva-
sive. Indians were to be assimilated as quickly as possible. None of 
the white Liberal rights were to be accorded to Mi'kmaq people if it 
meant that they would have the opportunity to choose to live as 
Mi'kmaq instead of British immigrants. The rule of law would 
provide no protection to Mi'kmaq people trying to exercise 
Mi'kmaq liberties. 
45 Tidey, supra note 31 at 48-51. In 1920 the Deputy Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs, Duncan Scott, convinced his Minister to submit Bill 14 to Parliament to 
amend the Indian Act empowering the department officials to involuntarily 
enfranchise Indians whom they considered no longer in need of "wardship status." 
Testifying before a Parliamentary committee on the Bill, 
Scott said: 
I think it would be in the interests of good administration if the 
provisions with regard to enfranchisement were further 
extended to enable the Department to enfranchise individual 
Indians or a Band of Indians without the necessity of obtaining 
their consent thereto in cases where it was found upon 
investigation that the continuance of wardship was no longer in 
the interests of the public or the Indians. 
When he was asked what the department's ultimate aim was, Scott replied: 
I want to get rid of the Indian problem. I do not think as a 
matter of fact, that this country ought to continuously protect a 
class of people who are able to stand alone. That is my whole 
point. Our objective is to continue until there is not a single 
Indian in Canada who has not been absorbed into the body 
politic, and there is no Indian question, and no Indian 
Department and that is the whole object of this Bill. 
Tidey notes that Bill 14 was passed, but repealed two years later when McKenzie 
King's Government was elected. However, the enfranchisement board was left in 
place, but the initiation of enfranchisement was to be considered by the board only 
upon application of an Indian. 
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The history of the relationship between the Mi'kmaq people in 
Nova Scotia and the Anglo-immigrants' governments may be 
summarized in three themes: 
First, there is legal acceptance of the doctrine of aborigi-
nal rights and treaties existing in the law of nature and 
nations, with contractual principles ordering the jurisdic-
tion of European nations and the American nations. 
Second, the law recognizes the necessity of uniting 
American nations in a political commonwealth by inter-
national treaties of protection, so that they can be pro-
tected by the ultimate sovereign against his subjects and 
other sovereigns. The third theme, the dark theme, is 
that once within the colonizer's legal system, each pro-
tecting government is mystically given by its courts the 
unlimited power to extinguish Indian treaty and aborigi-
nal rights for the good of the rest of the [Anglo] society. 
Moreover, the courts fail to question the legitimacy valid-
ity of the governmental actions under a command theory 
of law, and the basic contractual nature of political power 
in international law and political theory is ignored.46 
III. LIBERAL THEORY AND THE PROCESS OF 
NEWFOUNDLAND'S CONFEDERATION 
Newfoundland did not confederate with the other colonies in 
1867. British subjects in Newfoundland were not allowed to settle 
and own land in Newfoundland until 1824 when the Act to 
Encourage the Trade to Newfoundland, 169847 was repealed along 
with the old customary law governing those who came for the sea-
sonal fishery. There was no full time government until 1832. It was 
not until 1855 that British subjects in Newfoundland were granted 
the privilege of having responsible government. Newfoundland 
continued under responsible government until it went bankrupt in 
1934. England took over its debts and direct administration from 
1934 until confederation in 1949.48 
46 Henderson, supra note 3 at 220. 
47 Statute IO & 11 Will. 3., c. 25, 1698. 
48 D. W. Prowse, A History of Newfoundland (London: MacMillan, 1895) at 
427-29. 
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In 1947, Newfoundlanders were permitted by the British 
Government to elect a National Convention for the purpose of de-
bating the future political development of Newfoundland. The four 
options that were available were: continued Commission of 
Government, return to responsible government, confederation with 
Canada, or joining the United States. The later option was dropped 
by the National Convention. In 1947, a delegation from the 
National Convention was sent to Ottawa to enter into preliminary 
discussions to formulate the terms of confederation with Canada. 
In 1949, a referendum was held to determine which of the remain-
ing three options the people of Newfoundland would choose as 
their system of government. 
Prior to the referendum, the groups advocating for confedera-
tion or responsible government toured the outports delivering 
speeches and information on whichever political alternative they 
wished to encourage people to support. Thus, rural British subjects 
in Newfoundland were given some opportunity to be informed 
about the nature of the political alternatives available. Although a 
rough version of informed consent, it satisfied the British and 
Canadian Governments that the referendum vote could be seen as 
the free and voluntary consent of each individual to the outcome of 
the voting. 
The first referendum failed to indicate a majority for any of the 
three options. The Commission of government, having the least 
number of supporters was dropped from the second referendum. 
The second referendum showed that 52% approved confederation 
with Canada as the country in which they would become citizens 
and as the kind of democratic government the people of 
Newfoundland preferred. 49 
49 R. Gwyn, Smallwood: The Unlikely Revolutionary (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1972) at 111-12. 
In attempting to obtain the break down of votes from each outport the author 
of this paper was informed by the Provincial archivists that the official ballot count 
for each outport were destroyed after being sent in to St. John's. It is rumoured that 
the opponents to confederation wanted verification of the results from the First 
Nations communities in Newfoundland-Labrador. It was known that First Nations 
peoples had never voted in responsible government elections before, did not speak 
English and were rumoured to not have voted or were instructed to vote a certain 
way by their missionaries. The missionaries were known to be siding with the 
supporters of confederation and were suspected of influencing the voting in First 
Nation communities, if there was any voting. 
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The process of Newfoundland's confederation with Canada is a 
demonstration of the five basic principles of Liberal philosophy. 
The Imperial government granted British subjects in 
Newfoundland the opportunity to be self-determining in respect of 
the system of government under which they would live, thus oper-
ationalizing the ideas of individual liberty, freedom and the pursuit 
of happiness. It permitted individuals to be self-determining by 
choosing who would govern them and what kind of government it 
would be, thus determining the limits of its authority over them 
and, in their choice of democratic government, protecting their 
lives, liberties, and property by the rule of law. 
IV. OUTSIDE THE TERMS OF UNION: DID FIRST 
NATIONS IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR 
CONSENT TO CONFEDERATION AND 
ENFRANCHISEMENT? 
In 1947, Messrs. Burry (a Moravian Missionary from Labrador), 
Ashbourne (from St. John's, Newfoundland) and J. R .. Smallwood 
(from Gambo, Newfoundland), all representing the National 
Convention of Newfoundland, met with senior officials from the 
Department of Mines and Energy, the Department then responsi-
ble for Indian Affairs. The Federal officials were assigned to the 
sub-committee on Indian Affairs by the Department of External 
Affairs which led and coordinated the confederation negotiations 
for Canada.50 The purpose of this committee was to ascertain "how 
As the organizer of the first Aboriginal political organization in 
Newfoundland-Labrador in 1973 this author spoke with Innu, Inuit and Mi'kmaq 
elders who said no voting took place in their communities until some years after 
confederation. If votes from First Nation communities in Newfoundland-Labrador 
were counted in 1949 they would appear to be grounds to view them as seriously 
suspect, or at the very least uninformed, and not voluntary in the sense of an exercise 
of self-determination. If the First Nations peoples had understood they were voting 
to oppress their identities as Aboriginal peoples it is unlikely they would have voted 
for confederation, if they voted at all. 
50 Senior officials from the Department of External Affairs and other line 
departments of the Canadian government were assigned to discuss and draft the 
terms by which Newfoundland might consider confederation with Canada. R. 
Hoey was director ofindian Affairs and C. Jackson was acting Deputy Minister of 
Mines and Resources, the Department the Indian Affairs branch was in. These were 
the two most senior officials responsible for Indian Affairs in Canada. 
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the Indians and Eskimos in Newfoundland-Labrador, if any still 
exist, would be provided for in the event of confederation." The 
Canadian officials responsible for Indian Affairs advised that "in the 
event of Newfoundland becoming a province of Canada the 
Indians and Eskimos would be the sole responsibility of the federal 
government and that the following are some of the benefits that 
would come to them." Twelve benefits were listed: free education, 
free medical services, family allowances, land reserves for settle-
ments and traplines; free conservation projects, fishing projects and 
handicraft projects; trading posts provided by the federal govern-
ment if there were no private ones; exemption from land and in-
come taxes; protection by law of Indian rights recognized in the 
[Indian] Act; voting rights if they were no burden on the province 
or a municipality; no right to vote if on welfare; no right to use in-
toxicating liquors; and relief for the aged, but no old age pension.5 1 
These were the core federal services meant to assimilate First 
Nations people in a transitional manner over a period of time. 
Newfoundland representatives held numerous discussions with 
their own lawyers and officials of the British and Canadian 
Governments. They also intensively debated the options of gov-
ernment that were available to choose from within the National 
Convention in Newfoundland. However, the Anglo-Newfoundland 
officials never consulted with the First Nations in Newfoundland 
and Labrador nor asked them to determine what their position 
might be on confederation issues. When the terms of union were 
confirmed in the Constitution Act, 1949, there was no clause that 
explicitly dealt with the relationship between Canada and First 
Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador. First Nations people had no 
representation in the confederation negotiations and none of the 
terms of union recognized their existence. They were not included, 
as First Nations peoples, in confederation between Canada and 
Newfoundland. 
The terms of union between Canada and Newfoundland, how-
ever, did preserve federal legislative jurisdiction over "Indians, and 
Lands reserved for Indians." Section 3 states: 
5l N.A.C., M.G. 30e, 159, vol. 4, file-"Indians and Eskimos of Newfoundland," 
submitted 1950, Minutes, 2 September 1947, Report of the Indian and Eskimo 
Sub-committee. 
LIBERAL THEORY AS A TOOL OF COLONIALISM 131 
The British North American Acts, 1867 to 1940, shall ap-
ply to the Province of Newfoundland in the same way, 
and to the like extent as they apply to the provinces 
heretofore comprised in Canada, as if the Province of 
Newfoundland had been one of the provinces originally 
united, except in so far as varied by these Terms and ex-
cept such provisions as are in terms made or by reasonable 
intendment may be held to be specially applicable to or 
only to affect one or more and not all of the provinces 
originally united.52 
Subsection 91 (24) of the BNA Act, 1867 was not altered by any 
of the terms of union. Thus, Newfoundland and Canada were bound 
by subsection 91 (24) of the BNA Act, 1867. The responsibility for 
"Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians" continued to be a federal 
constitutional responsibility. However, this did not stop federal 
officials from deliberately avoiding fulfillment of their direct and 
exclusive constitutional responsibility. 
The denial of freedom of self-determination to the First 
Nations started with their exclusion from the Newfoundland 
National Convention in 1947. The exclusion of First Nations was 
continued in the Newfoundland referendums in 1947-48. The ex-
clusion of First Nations was extended into the negotiations of the 
terms of union when their rights and interests were deliberately left 
out of the terms of union in 1949. As a result of their exclusion from 
the confederation process, the people of the First Nations 
communities in Newfoundland-Labrador never participated in nor 
consented to the process of confederation between Newfoundland 
and Canada. Past Newfoundland Colonial and Commission 
Governments had never made treaties nor passed any laws that 
applied directly to First Nations people. Up to the time of 
confederation, the First Nation societies in Newfoundland-
Labrador had lived independently based on their own self-
determined accommodative relationships with anglo-immigrants 
and their own customary law. 
52 The Constitution Act, 1949. 
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V. A NEW FEDERAL POLICY OF ASSIMILATION BY 
INVOLUNTARY ENFRANCHISEMENT 
The implementation of a new federal experimental policy to assimi-
late First Nations began in September of 1949. H. L. Keenlyside, 
Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources, the Department respon-
sible for Indian affairs at that time, wrote to N. A. Robertson, 
Secretary to the Cabinet, informing him that Cabinet had decided 
on January 25, 1949, prior to confederation, that 
'The government agreed that the decision respecting the 
case of Indians and Eskimos in Newfoundland and 
Labrador following union be deferred until such time as a 
satisfactory arrangement could be made with the 
Provincial government after an election of a Provincial 
Legislature in Newfoundland' .... I am writing to bring 
to your attention the fact that this department is not tak-
ing any action regarding the care of Indians and Eskimos 
in Newfoundland and Labrador pending the conclusion 
of the satisfactory arrangement referred to in this quota-
tion.53 
D. MacKay, the director of the Indian Affairs Branch under 
Keenlyside, prepared a "Secret" memorandum for his Deputy set-
ting out recommendations as to what position the Federal govern-
ment should take with respect to their responsibility for First 
Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador. MacKay stated that he had 
met with K. J. Carter, past Commissioner of Resources (British 
Commission Government in Newfoundland) and now Deputy 
Minister of Resources in the Newfoundland Government, on 7 
October 1948, and with J. R. Smallwood on 15 November 1948. 
MacKay claimed that on both occasions it was agreed that the 
Province should administer Indian and Eskimo Affairs, "subject to 
a suitable grant or subsidy by the Dominion, rather than have the 
Indians brought under the Indian Act." His reasons for this were: 
At the present time the Indians of Newfoundland have 
full citizenship status ... and if placed under the Indian 
Act . .. their civil status would be reduced. It was felt it 
would be a retrograde step to deprive Indians of any po-
litical rights which they enjoy at the present time. This 
53 NAC RG 2/18, Vol. 172, File N-18-3. 13 September 1949, H. L. Keenlyside, 
D.M., Mines and Resources, to N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet. 
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view is in accord with the general aim of Indian administra-
tion in Canada which is that, in due course, the Indians 
should take their place as full citizens of Canada. This ob-
jective was emphasised in discussions before the Special Joint 
Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons which 
sat during the 1946, 1947 and 1948 Sessions of Parliament. 
Another reason for not bringing the Newfoundland 
Indians under the Indian Act is that they do not live on 
reserves and could not be readily adapted to our sys-
tem .... It is understood that there are several hundred 
Indians in Central and Southern Labrador, who are not 
under any special supervision or restrictions except that 
they are not permitted to buy liquor. On the Island of 
Newfoundland, the Indians [Mi'kmaq] are merged with 
other citizens and have full citizenship rights. Their num-
ber is not known but is said to be small. I may mention 
that the Indians on the Island are descendants of 
Micmacs who emigrated from Prince Edward Island and 
Nova Scotia years ago. The original Indians of 
Newfoundland, the Beothucks, are extinct .... It will be 
noted that the expenses referred to in Mr. Carter's letter 
are for the small group in Northern Labrador but a grant 
or subsidy would involve all the Indians of the Province with 
the exception of those on the Island of Newfoundland 
(emphasis added). 54 
This letter set the position the Federal Government would take for 
the next 16 years. 
During this time the Federal Government provided a few small 
grants to the Government of Newfoundland for tuberculosis pro-
grams in Northern Labrador, but refused to assume any responsibil-
ity for First Nations in the Province. Instead, federal officials would 
claim that First Nations in Newfoundland and Labrador were 
"enfranchised" and, therefore, were not Indians pursuant to the 
Indian Act or subsection 91(24) of the ENA Act. Thus, there were 
no federal obligations owed to them. 
In 1962, the Hon. W. J. Browne, Solicitor General, referred a 
letter from the Roman Catholic School Board of Northern 
Labrador to Hon. Ellen Fairclough, Minister responsible for Indian 
54 NAC RG 2/18, Vol. 172, File N-18-3. 25 October 1949, H. L. Keenlyside, 
D. M., Mines and Resources, to N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet, 
correspondence and attached "Secret" Memorandum. 
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Affairs. The letter from the Catholic School authorities requested 
federal assistance for construction of Indian day schools in 
Sheshashit and Davis Inlet, Labrador, on the basis that the Federal 
Government had responsibility for Indians. Ms. Fairclough replied: 
As you are aware, this is a problem that has arisen on nu-
merous occasions, and the position which has been taken 
by the federal government is that the Indians of 
Newfoundland were enfranchised and full citizens of the 
Province on the day when Newfoundland entered 
Canada in 1949, and that consequently the federal gov-
ernment has no constitutional responsibility for the per-
sons oflndian ethnic origin in the Province.55 
Thus, the Mi'kmaq, Innu and Inuit Nations of Newfoundland and 
Labrador were deemed to have been already assimilated even 
though this was not negotiated in the terms of union or accom-
plished by subsequent Federal legislation. At that time, in order for 
an Indian to be enfranchised he or she had to have de-Indianized 
themselves as set out in the Indian Act. If a First Nation's woman 
married a non-Indian or a non-status Indian, she would have been 
involuntarily enfranchised. In order for a male Indian to be enfran-
chised he had to speak English or French, be free of debt and be 
considered of good character (by the local Indian Agent or Cleric). 
He could then apply for enfranchisement to the Indian Affairs 
board set up to review such applications. 
In 1963, an exchange of views on the federal government's pol-
icy of Indian assimilation between the Hon. Arthur Laing, Minister 
of Northern Affairs and National Resources, who was then respon-
sible for Eskimo Affairs, and R. G. Robertson, Secretary to the 
Cabinet, transpired. Robertson wrote: 
The Indian Affairs Branch have felt for some time that 
the most fruitful line of progress for many of the 
Indians-perhaps for all of them-has to be in the direc-
tion of more complete integration with other people in 
the provinces where they live. The reservations are much 
too small to support anything like the total population 
and the special aspects of treatment create a separateness 
55 21 March 1962, Hon. Ellen Fairclough to Hon. W. J. Browne, Solicitor 
General, in Cabinet Memorandum of22 April 1965. 
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that in many cases at least appears to operate, in the long 
term, to the disadvantage of the Indians. 
A number of the provinces have problems with re-
spect to the people of mixed blood that are essentially 
the same as those that involve the Indians and, in many 
respects, I understand that the problems are similar for 
large groups of economically depressed people who are 
simply 'white' with no racial mixture. For these reasons, 
some of the provinces too have expressed an interest in 
discussing arrangements under which differences in 
treatment would gradually disappear. I do not think 
anyone believes that a quick change in status or treatment 
is possible or desirable-it is rather a question of the di -
rection in which gradual movement should occur. The 
Indian Affairs Branch are, like you, very much concerned 
that any changes should carry with it the general views 
and wishes of the Indian people. At the same time, I 
think they are aware that there might be insoluble prob-
lems if one assumed that there had to be a definite con -
currence [by the Indians] expressed in a program of ad-
justment.56 
After the election of Lester Pearson's Liberal government in 
1964, J. W. Pickersgill, a Liberal M.P. from Newfoundland, was 
appointed as Minister of Transport. Pickersgill was the first M.P. 
from Newfoundland to witness and appreciate the full extent of 
federal services and expenditures on First Nations across Canada. 
What he witnessed must have impressed upon him the unfairness of 
the federal policy regarding First Nations in Newfoundland-
Labrador. He had received copies of correspondence from 
Newfoundland ministers to other federal ministers concerning fed-
eral subsidies for Newfoundland's expenditures on Indians and 
Eskimos. The interim agreements that Newfoundland had with 
Ottawa for reimbursement for health programs and facilities for 
SG 23 October 1963, Hon. Arthur Laing, Minister of Northern Affairs, to R. G. 
Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet. This correspondence was provided to]. W. 
Pickersgill, M.P. (NF) after he had asked Prime Minister Pearson for a legal 
review of the federal position on Aboriginal people in Newfoundland (Letter of 21 
October 1963). Pearson refused Pickersgill's request for a legal review saying that 
it was a matter of policy for Cabinet to review, but provided Pickersgill with 
Laing's and Robertson's correspondence to give him a sample of the policy issue of 
how assimilation oflndians should proceed (Letter of24 October 1963). 
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Indians and Eskimos in Labrador were expiring and Newfoundland 
officials were under the impression that these subsidies would not 
be renewed. Pickersgill was asked by Newfoundland officials to 
take these matters up with Prime Minister Pearson.57 
Pickersgill first tried to persuade the Prime Minister to begin a 
legal review or a reference put to the Supreme Court of Canada to 
determine if the Federal Government had responsibility for First 
Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador, but Pearson refused. 58 Having 
failed to achieve any results from within, Pickersgill tried another 
political avenue. He wrote to Premier Smallwood on March 17, 
1964, stating: 
As you and I know, the federal government has never 
been willing to assert its constitutional jurisdiction over 
the Indians and Eskimos of Newfoundland but instead 
has adopted a "Pontius Pilate" attitude. I think the time 
has now come to put our government on the spot and my 
suggestion would be that you write a letter to the Prime 
Minister somewhat along the lines of the enclosed draft 
but that, instead of signing it and sending it as a formal 
communication, you send it along with a covering letter 
asking his advice as to whether it should be modified in 
anyway. I see no other way of getting this matter brought 
into focus and I am sure it is very important that it be 
brought into proper focus before negotiations with 
Quebec are finally settled. 59 
In Pickersgill's draft letter for Premier Smallwood to send to 
Prime Minister Pearson, he stated that during the terms of union it 
was Canada who refused to accept responsibility for Indians and 
Eskimos. The draft letter then pointed out that the terms of union 
had not changed Canada's constitutional responsibility for Indians 
and Eskimos throughout Newfoundland: 
since no reference was made to Indians and Eskimos in 
the Terms of Union, the B.N.A. Act as interpreted by the 
Courts must apply to them in Newfoundland to pre -
cisely the same extent as it applies to them in Quebec or 
5? 21 October 1963, Correspondence, J. W. Pickersgill, Secretary of State, to 
Prime Minister Pearson. 
ss 24 October 1963, Correspondence, Prime Minister Pearson to J. W. 
Pickersgill, Secretary of State. 
59 17 March 1964, J. W. Pickersgill to Premier J. Smallwood. 
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in other Provinces, and that therefore the Parliament and 
the Government of Canada cannot divest themselves of 
their jurisdiction or their responsibility. 
It would be particularly difficult for us to acquiesce 
in neglect of this responsibility in Newfoundland at the 
very time it is being asserted [federal responsibility] so 
strongly by the Government of Canada in relation to the 
Eskimos of Quebec. 
We feel that Newfoundland is entitled to equal 
treatment with Quebec and other Provinces. We would 
be prepared to have the Government of Canada take over 
full responsibility for the Indians of Indians and Eskimos of 
Labrador, as you presumably have a right to do under the 
Constitution (emphasis added). 6o 
Thus, having built the bargaining position that, since 
Newfoundland was not being treated equally with other provinces 
in respect to federal expenditures on Aboriginal peoples, the 
Federal Government should take over all responsibility for Indians 
and Eskimos in Labrador, or, in the alternative: 
if the Government of Canada would still prefer, as it in-
dicated it would in 1948, to have the Indians and 
Eskimos of Newfoundland treated in precisely the same 
way as other inhabitants of the Province, we are quite 
prepared to continue on that basis provided the 
Government of Canada will give us the same degree of 
financial support as is given directly by the Government 
of Canada in respect of the Indians and Eskimos living in 
other provinces. Naturally, if such payments were made, 
we would be quite prepared to accept any reasonable 
measures of supervision or inspection which the appro-
priate departments of the Government of Canada felt 
should be imposed to make sure that the money was be-
ing used for the welfare and advancement of the Indians 
and Eskimos and that their Constitutional rights were 
fully safeguarded. 61 
This letter was sent unaltered to Prime Minister Pearson by 
Premier Smallwood on March 23, 1964. As a result, Prime Minister 
Pearson directed his Minister responsible for Indian Affairs, the 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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Hon. Arthur Laing, to prepare a Cabinet Memorandum on the is-
sue of Federal responsibility for Indians and Eskimos in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
On April 22, 1965 this Memorandum was submitted to the 
Prime Minister. In the covering letter, the Minister makes it clear 
that the recommendations in the Memorandum are aimed at ac-
complishing the general objective the Federal Government had for 
all Indians: 
Moreover, the arrangement with respect to Indians is a 
dynamic one and gives promise of the eventual achieve -
ment of Canada's objective which would see the Indians 
take their place in the larger community receiving services 
and accepting responsibilities on the same basis as all 
other citizens. 62 
The objective of assimilation is described in these same terms in the 
"Background" summary of the Memorandum. It is totally inconsis-
tent with the Federal premise that First Nations in Newfoundland-
Labrador were enfranchised. To be enfranchised an Indian had to 
be considered assimilated. If the First Nations in Newfoundland 
and Labrador had already been assimilated, the Federal objective 
would have been already achieved, therefore, there was no need to 
give the Newfoundland Government any money for Indians and 
Eskimos who no longer existed in that "different" (unassimilated) 
state! 
Despite this inconsistency, Federal officials had, on two occa-
sions, requested legal opinions from the Federal Department of 
Justice on federal responsibilities for First Nations in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. The Department of Justice did not 
concur with the belief of federal officials that the Federal 
Government had no responsibility for First Nations in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. 
In 1950, Deputy Minister F. P. Varcoe had been asked for an 
opinion by N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet: 
as to the precise legal extent of the federal government's 
responsibility insofar as Indians and Eskimos residing in 
Newfoundland and Labrador are concerned ... with re-
62 22 April 1965, Hon. Arthur Laing to Prime Minister Pearson. 
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spect to federal jurisdiction over, and responsibility for 
Newfoundland Indians and Eskimos.63 
Deputy Minister Varcoe replied: 
It is the responsibility of the federal government to for-
mulate policies and carry out all policies that are directed 
at dealing with Indian or Indian problems. Such policy is 
to be formulated by Parliament and the executive. This 
responsibility carries with it the responsibility of provid-
ing money to be devoted to the carrying out of policies 
in relation to the Indians. 64 
Another opinion was sought by Mr. W. Fischer, Legal Advisor 
to the Department of Northern Affairs, in preparing the Cabinet 
Memorandum of April 1965. Fischer had contacted Deputy 
Attorney-General A. F. Dridger asking for his opinion on the draft 
memorandum. Fischer was troubled by the inconsistency between 
the Federal Government's past policy and new initiative with re-
spect to Aboriginal peoples in Newfoundland. Fischer wanted to 
know how to explain why the Government of Canada had failed to 
accept Varcoe' s 1950 opinion and explicitly rejected responsibility 
in Hon. Ellen Fairclough' s letter of March 21, 1962. 65 Mr. Driedger 
replied that Mr. Varcoe's opinion of 1950, "as to the constitutional 
position is correct." He added that he saw no conflict between Ms. 
Fairclough's letter and Mr. Varcoe's opinion because 
Mr. Varcoe was dealing with legislative authority, that is, 
the power to pass law, while in the fourth paragraph of his 
letter he was speaking of responsibility, or to use another 
word, the obligation to formulate and carry out policies. 
I suggest that it is this second aspect of the matter that is 
the subject of Mrs. Fairclough' s letter. Whether the situ-
ation of Eskimos and Indians in Newfoundland is such 
63 31 March 1950, N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet, to F. P. Varcoe, 
Deputy Attorney General, Dept. of Justice. 
64 14 April 1950, F. P. Varcoe, Deputy Attorney General, Dept. of Justice, to 
N. A. Robertson, Secretary to the Cabinet. 
65 Supra note 58 for citation. 
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that special policies and programmes are required is, of 
course, not a legal question.66 
Either Mr. Driedger had not read, or misinterpreted Mrs. 
Fairclough's statement that the Federal Government had no 
"constitutional responsibility" for Indians and Eskimos in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. Mrs. Fairclough was speaking of 
legislative authority. Her statement is an obvious reference to the 
past federal position that subsection 91 (24) of the BNA Act, I 867 
does not apply to Indians or Eskimos in Newfoundland or 
Labrador. 
The Memorandum of 1965 contains a legal review of the con-
stitutional position of Indians and Eskimos in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. It summarizes the previous federal legal opinions and 
what the federal officials believed about First Nations m 
Newfoundland-Labrador: 
The opinions make clear that the federal parliament has 
exclusive legislative authority with respect to Indians and 
Eskimos of the Province of Newfoundland, and the asso-
ciated responsibility to formulate policies directed to-
ward dealing with Indian and Eskimo problems.67 
The drafter of the legal opinion in the Memorandum was still 
trying to reconcile why federal practice was not following the 
opinion Mr. Varcoe gave in 1950 with respect to federal constitu-
tional responsibility for First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador. 
The writer sets out Minister Fairclough's position in 1962: 
Thus, the Indians and Eskimos in Labrador were, at the 
time of union, in the same position as persons of Indian 
origin in the provinces who have been enfranchised or 
who are Meris ... for whom the federal government has 
not considered itself obligated .... 68 
However, the review then acknowledges that to characterize the 
First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador as enfranchised Indians 
66 23 November 1964, A. F. Driedger, Deputy Attorney General, to W. Fischer, 
Legal Advisor to the Dept. of Northern Affairs. In the Cabinet Memorandum of 
April 22, 1965. 
67 22 April 1965, Cabinet Memorandum, "Contributions to Newfoundland 
Respecting Indians and Eskimos." 
68 Ibid. 
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or Metis was discriminatory and inconsistent with the treatment of 
Western Aboriginal groups: 
It is understood that the persons of Eskimo origin in 
Labrador have a high infusion of white blood and their 
situation, therefore, might to this extent be equated with 
that of the Metis. It should be noted, however, that the 
Metis, in Western Canada at least, were given a choice at 
the time the treaties were negotiated as to whether or not 
they would continue to be considered as Indians or ac-
cept script for settlement as ordinary citizens of the 
country. This option has never been extended to the 
Eskimos of Labrador. The other process whereby Indians 
no longer come within the scope of federal programs and 
policies also depend upon the individual's decision 
through enfranchisement, by marriage, or by voluntary 
resettlement in non-Indian areas. 
It is understood that the Indian population of 
Labrador has not had the same degree of relationship 
with non-Indians and that there is very little white blood 
amongst these people. In fact, it seems probable that the 
Indians of Labrador are much more Indian, in blood, in 
way of life and in attitudes and customs than many 
Indian groups on the mainland of Canada. As with the 
Eskimos, the Indians in Labrador have had no choice as 
had persons of Indian origin in Canada who are not now 
considered to be the policy or financial responsibility of 
Canada. 
This interpretation of Mrs. Fairclough's letter is 
therefore open to question on the grounds first that, 
contrary to enfranchised Indians, the Indians and 
Eskimos have been given no choice with respect to their 
status; second, that they (particularly the Indians) remain 
as distinct and separate communities clearly identifiable 
by language, culture, way of life and problems; third, 
that these two groups have required, and will need for 
some time in the future, special programs similar to those 
provided Indians and Eskimos elsewhere in Canada and, 
fourth, that these people in Labrador should have access 
to the same resources and programs as Indians and 
Eskimos elsewhere in Canada. 
In light of the opinions given by Mr. Varcoe on April 
14, 1950, and Mr. Driedger on November 23, 1964, it 
seems distinctly possible that Indians in the Province of 
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Newfoundland could demand to be registered under the 
Indian Act, thereby becoming eligible for the special assis-
tance provided by the Act for persons registered in ac-
cordance with it, and it seems distinctly possible that 
such a demand would have to be complied with. 
Although the constitutional position in terms of leg-
islative authority is clear, the legal position really rests 
upon whether the Indians and Eskimos of Labrador can 
be considered as such in terms of the British North 
America Act. The conclusion to be drawn from the outline 
of the situation given above seems to support a substantial 
degree of federal obligation with respect to the formulation 
of policies and the voting of funds to provide for programs on 
their behalf(emphasis in original). 69 
This review echoes R. G. Robertson's remarks in his 1963 letter 
to Hon. Arthur Laing, wherein he stated that there should be, at a 
minimum, consultation with First Nations on Federal policies that 
affected them. However, Federal and Newfoundland officials pro-
vided no such opportunity to First Nations in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. First Nations were kept deliberately ignorant of decisions 
by the Newfoundland and Federal Governments that would deny 
them the liberty to determine their relationship with Canada and 
Newfoundland. 
With regard to the Mi'kmaq people on the Island of 
Newfoundland the position conveyed by the provincial premier and 
other officials in 1949-50 was added in the back pages of the 
Memorandum. It stated: 
There are a certain number of Indians resident on the 
Island of Newfoundland, but since most of these people 
have been or are in the process of being integrated with 
the white population it has been informally agreed with the 
Provincial authorities that no special arrangements need be 
made on their behalf by the Federal Government 
(emphasis added). 70 
This statement was incorrect. Conne River on the south coast of 
Newfoundland, Badger and Glenwood in central Newfoundland 
and St. Georges, in St. Georges Bay on the west coast of 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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Newfoundland, were functioning Mi'kmaq communities in 1949.71 
Apparently there was very little research done on the history of First 
Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador by Federal officials. The 
drafters of the Cabinet Memorandum relate the history of the 
relationship between First Nations, the British Crown and the 
Colonial Government of Newfoundland in two very important 
sentences: 
There are no treaties or agreements with the native popu-
lation similar to the Indian treaties which exist in the rest 
of Canada. Theoretically, at least, Indians and Eskimos 
are fully enfranchised except for the privilege of purchas-
ing liquor (emphasis in original).72 
The first statement is accurate for the Innu and Inuit Nations in 
Labrador, but not correct for the Mi'kmaq on the Island of 
Newfoundland whose Chief signed an adhesion to the treaty of 
1752 in 1761. The second statement is presumptuous and incorrect 
in light of the protection of the prerogative law of the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 that set Indians and Lands reserved for 
Indians apart from Anglo-British subjects in North America. 
Further, it presumes that informal agreements between federal and 
provincial officials deeming First Nations people as enfranchised 
and dispensing with federal constitutional responsibilities to them 
would be sufficient to amend subsection 91 (24) of the B.NA. Act. 
The Cabinet Memorandum concludes: 
From a purely constitutional point of view, it is difficult 
to see how the Federal Government can escape at least 
some responsibility for Indians and Eskimos in the new 
province as the British North America Act vests in the 
Parliament of Canada exclusive legislative authority in re-
spect of this group. 73 
In a draft letter from Prime Minister Pearson to Premier 
Smallwood, the Federal Government sought to circumvent its con-
7 l As the organizer of the first Aboriginal political organization in 
Newfoundland-Labrador, I found distinct Mi'kmaq communities and groups in 
these same locations in Newfoundland in 1971. They still practiced an adaptive 
form of Mi'kmaq culture, considered themselves as Mi'kmaq and were identified 
by neighbouring communities of Newfoundlanders as Mi'kmaq. 
72 Supra note 67. 
73 Ibid. 
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stitutional responsibility for First Nations in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. In the letter, the proposal was that Newfoundland could 
administer Indian and Eskimo Affairs, that the Federal 
Government would provide a capped level of subsidy, and that the 
agreement would be reviewed and re-negotiated every five years. 
This periodic renewal was proposed by federal officials who hoped 
that in the next five to ten years federal responsibility for Indians 
would be shifted to the provinces throughout Canada as part of the 
federal assimilation scheme. First Nations in Newfoundland-
Labrador would be used by federal officials as an example of the 
new policy. The five-year agreements would permit the federal 
government to phase itself out of all responsibility for Indian Affairs 
in the future.74 
The proposal set out in the draft letter was approved without 
changes by Cabinet and was sent to Premier Smallwood on May 
74 22 April 1965, Memorandum for Cabinet: 
Recommendations 
13. After considering the various ways in which the problem can 
be met, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the 
federal government should not assume continuing commitments 
on a permanent basis in respect of Indians and Eskimos in 
Labrador .... Arguments supporting this point of view are set 
out in Appendix "A." ... 17 ..... Although the proposal involves 
relatively large Federal disbursements during the first few years, 
it holds the dual advantage of enabling a really significant 
contribution to be made towards the rehabilitation of Labrador 
and, at the same time, of gradually relieving the Federal 
Government of all direct responsibility, both financial and 
administrative, for this segment of the Indian and Eskimo 
population of Canada. 
Appendix "A" Arguments Against Continuing Federal 
Participation In Indian and Eskimo Affairs In Northern 
Labrador 
1. The Government's Indian policy in the rest of Canada has 
been for a number of years to encourage voluntary 
enfranchisement in order to enable Indians to take their place in 
sociery on the basis of complete equality with other Canadian 
citizens. It would be a retrograde step if the Federal Government 
were to do anything that would result in converting the Indians 
and Eskimos of Northern Labrador into wards of the state. 
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25, 1965.75 Prime Minister Pearson concluded his unconstitutional 
proposal by reiterating the policy the Federal Government wanted 
to extend to every other province in Canada: 
I know it is your objective, as well as ours, to see that the 
Indians and Eskimos take their place as full participating 
members of the provincial community, accepting all the 
responsibilities and receiving all the benefits of other citi-
zens.76 
What the Prime Minister openly admits in this final paragraph is 
that the Innu and Inuit are not enfranchised and still need to be as-
similated. This makes them no different than any other First 
Nation in other areas of Canada with whom the Federal 
Government made treaties and who received special services-
covertly aimed at assimilating them in a transitional process. 
This Federal decision radically departed from previous Anglo-
Canadian policy that had been followed since England's contact 
with North American First Nations. The treaty-making process 
that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 codified in prerogative law and 
which Canada was founded on was ignored. Federal responsibility 
to carry out the treaty-making process was abandoned. Premier 
Smallwood accepted the Prime Minister's proposal on June 2, 1965. 
Between 1949 and 1965, the Federal Government had avoided 
declaring the Indian Act to be in effect in Newfoundland pursuant 
to subsection 18(2) of the terms of union: 
Statutes of the Parliament of Canada in force at the date 
of Union, or any part thereof, shall come into force in the 
Province of Newfoundland on a day or days to be fixed 
by Act of Parliament or by proclamation of the 
Governor-General in Council issued from time to 
. 77 time ... 
75 25 May 1965, Correspondence, Prime Minster Pearson to Premier 
]. Smallwood. 
76 Supra note 75 at 6. 
77 A review of Appendix 12 of the Revised Statutes of Newfoundland include all 
Proclamations of Federal laws in effect in Newfoundland by the Governor-General 
in Council. The Indian Act is not listed in any of these proclamations. The statutory 
provision that the laws of Canada are always speaking in the federal Interpretation 
Act does not over come the constitutionally prescribed process of bringing federal 
laws into effect in Newfoundland. 
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This ensured that the existence of First Nations would be hidden 
along with the Federal responsibility to enter into a treaty process 
with the First Nations in Newfoundland-Labrador. 
VI. LIBERAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND GENERAL 
COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES 
There are several underlying themes that are tenets of Liberal phi-
losophy in the Federal and Newfoundland positions held between 
1949 and 1964. The first is the federal position that Aboriginal 
peoples should be assimilated as quickly as possible. This would end 
federal expenditures for special services and move Indians onto 
provincial services where they would be treated the same as the non-
Indian population in the provinces where they resided. The assimi-
lation of First Nations flows from the Liberal tenant that posits 
formal equality. 
The Federal decision to pretend that First Nations in 
Newfoundland and Labrador had already been assimilated and 
were "enfranchised" is inconsistent with the repeated federal wish to 
have them eventually take their place as "fully participating citi-
zens." The statements of federal officials and politicians demon-
strate that First Nations peoples in Newfoundland-Labrador were 
not considered fully assimilated. First Nations in Newfoundland 
and Labrador, however, were given no choice between enfranchise-
ment or entering into treaties and registering as Indians under the 
Indian Act. 
Providing First Nations with such a choice would have made it 
possible for them to become informed of their rights under the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763. Even though the Federal Memorandum 
acknowledged that no treaties had been made in Newfoundland-
Labrador, the standard step of treaty making that had been estab-
lished by British and Canadian legal policy was not discussed. Had 
the rule of law been complied with, the Federal Government would 
have had to hold treaty discussions with First Nations. This would 
have led to setting aside reserves and registering First Nations peo-
ples in Newfoundland-Labrador under the Indian Act as the legal 
review in the Memorandum for Cabinet highlighted. This was not 
the action that federal civil servants and politicians wanted to un-
dertake in Newfoundland-Labrador. 
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Federal policy development with respect to Indian Affairs had 
been searching for a way to implement a faster method of assimilat-
ing First Nations since 1950. The protection from assimilation 
which the Indian Act and reserves provided were seen as creating "a 
separateness that ... appears to operate, in the long term, to the 
disadvantage of Indians."78 The "disadvantage" appears to be that 
they were not being assimilated into British culture. 
To support the fiction that Indians in Newfoundland and 
Labrador were already enfranchised, Federal officials pointed to the 
fact that the old Colonial and Commission of Government had 
never passed any laws with respect to Indians or Eskimos. Federal 
officials claimed this meant that Aboriginal people were already 
"enfranchised"-no longer Indian-the goal of the Indian Act. 
Therefore, the Federal Government could claim, as Hon. Ellen 
Fairclough did in her letter of 1962, that Aboriginal people in 
Newfoundland and Labrador had been enfranchised since the first 
day of confederation and that the Federal Government had no re-
sponsibility for them. However, as noted above, if this position was 
truly believed, then it would have been illogical to give funds to 
Newfoundland for the purpose of assimilating First Nations which 
Federal officials had claimed were already assimilated. 
The opportunity for First Nations peoples to be fully informed 
of the Federal Government's legal obligations and then to exercise 
individual choice as to the relationship they wished to have with 
Canada was denied. The people of the First Nations in 
Newfoundland and Labrador were denied a process similar to that 
enjoyed by Anglo-immigrants in Newfoundland that was based on 
respect for individual liberty, informed choice, and consent. 
The Newfoundland Government's position was also based on a 
tenant of Liberal philosophy. The Government of Newfoundland 
claimed that it, and those it represented, was not being treated 
"equally" with the other provinces of Canada. Newfoundlanders 
were paying for services for Indians and Eskimos in Labrador that 
the federal government was paying for everywhere else in Canada. 
In essence, the Government of Newfoundland claimed, on behalf 
of its constituents, that it was being "harmed." Newfoundland 
wanted the Government of Canada to intervene, to take over the 
78 Robertson to Laing, supra note 56. 
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responsibility for Aboriginal people in Labrador or pay them to 
administer Indian and Eskimo affairs. 
If funded to administer Indian and Eskimo Affairs, 
Newfoundland proposed that it would implement the policy of as-
similation and formal equality which the Federal Government 
wanted to implement in other areas of Canada. Newfoundland 
stated it would not provide any special services for Aboriginal peo-
ple. Instead Newfoundland would treat First Nations people 
"precisely the same way as other inhabitants (Anglo-immigrants) of 
the province." 
In reality, what Newfoundland was attempting to obtain was a 
double payment for Aboriginal people. Aboriginal peoples were al-
ready counted once as members of the general Newfoundland 
population for purposes of transfer and other payments from the 
Federal Government and, under this proposal, the Federal 
Government would pay Newfoundland for them again as 
Aboriginal peoples. However, special services, as the Federal 
Government promised in 1947, would not be provided by the 
provincial government. This was the liberal vision of individual de-
velopment Newfoundland officials had for Aboriginal peoples. This 
was their proposal that would satisfy their self-actualization as gov-
ernment officials in structuring Newfoundland society, and was 
adopted as government policy. 
Absent from all this discussion is any acknowledgment by either 
level of government that Aboriginal peoples in Newfoundland had 
any right to be informed or to freely determine what their living ar-
rangements with the Anglo-immigrants might be. It was suggested 
in the Federal Memorandum to Cabinet that this was done in west-
ern Canada, yet this precedent was not referred to in the recom-
mendations drafted by policy makers. 
Ironically, under the Indian Act, Mi'kmaq people in Nova 
Scotia were not seen as having any individual Liberal-like rights to 
freely determine their form of government unless they requested to 
be enfranchised. In Newfoundland and Labrador, Aboriginal peo-
ples whose identities as Aboriginal people had been legally op-
pressed so that they could be considered "enfranchised" were not 
accorded the same right as Anglo-immigrants freely and voluntarily 
to determine what their status would be, who would govern them, 
and to which level of the Canadian government they would relate. 
Thus, it appears that being considered "enfranchised" did not mean 
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that First Nations people in Newfoundland-Labrador would be ac-
corded Liberal democratic privileges. The right to pursue one's own 
vision of happiness, to determine one's government through a pro-
cess of informed voluntary consent, to be free of state interference, 
and to expect protection of one's life, liberty and property from 
individuals and the state, was not provided to First Nations in 
Newfoundland and Labrador. Enfranchisement was used as an ex-
cuse to withhold the rights of First Nations peoples to negotiate 
their own terms of a social contract with Canada and 
Newfoundland. 
The Cabinet Memorandum of 1965 demonstrates, I would 
suggest, that the Innu and Inuit Nations of Labrador were still con-
sidered as "Indians and Eskimos." Federal officials did not believe 
that these racial and cultural differences could be extinguished by 
involuntary enfranchisement. For the Mi'kmaq people on the Island 
of Newfoundland, the Government of Newfoundland had re-
quested that the Federal Government ignore them entirely. The 
Government of Newfoundland was not even prepared to take extra 
Federal monies via the unconstitutional agreement of 1965 for the 
Mi'kmaq. The Federal Government was remarkably willing to ac-
commodate the unconstitutional wishes of the Newfoundland 
Government without question, investigation, or consultation to de-
termine what the wishes of the Mi'kmaq people on the Island of 
Newfoundland might have been. 
Foreign people with foreign values unilaterally applied their vi-
sion of the Liberal principles of the social contract to First Nations 
in Newfoundland-Labrador, classifying them as "enfranchised." 
The element of free voluntary choice and consent to 
"enfranchisement" that the legal opinion in the Cabinet 
Memorandum of April 1965 highlighted was ignored. In order to 
relieve itself of its responsibility to enter into treaties and provide 
special services and protection as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 di-
rected, the Federal and Provincial Governments secretly withheld 
information from First Nations in order to deny them the oppor-
tunity to exercise their Liberal individual rights in a "treaty com-
monwealth," an Aboriginal-Crown social contract. 
Like the dispossession of Mi'kmaq properties in Nova Scotia, 
the Federal and Newfoundland Anglo-immigrant Governments 
dispossessed First Nations of their property and political rights in 
Newfoundland and Labrador by asserting that they had voluntarily 
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enfranchised themselves. This appears to have also been equated 
with a voluntary cession of political and territorial rights. Thus, the 
Federal Government could claim that First Nations had de-
Indianized themselves and their reserved lands. There were no 
"Indians," and no "Lands reserved for Indians" that the Federal 
Government had responsibility for in Newfoundland-Labrador. 
Once again, Anglo-immigrants had acted so as to place their 
own Liberal individual rights over those of First Nations people. 
However, in Newfoundland and Labrador it was not accomplished 
by overtly racist legal decisions. Rather, it was accomplished by the 
Liberal theory of equality. The Liberal theory of equality put a kind 
and benevolent face on this nineteenth century form of colonial 
racism. It declared that First Nations people were formally "equal" 
in citizenship rights. What this really amounted to was the negation 
of First Nation's Aboriginal rights by making it appear that First 
Nations had abandoned their political rights and territorial re-
sources, permitting the immigrant governments to assume control 
and possession over them. This form of assimilative equality meant 
that First Nations people had gained nothing, but had lost their 
identities and rights as Aboriginal peoples. This arbitrary characteri-
zation as enfranchised Indians was meant to make them legally un-
recognizable at law as Aboriginal peoples ... or at least Canadian 
and Newfoundland officials believe this would be the outcome of 
any legal challenges to what they had "informally" agreed to do to 
the Aboriginal nations in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
The Canadian rule of law now includes a direction to the 
Federal and Newfoundland Governments that existing aboriginal 
and treaty rights must be recognized and affirmed by them as re-
quired by subsection 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In R. v. 
Sparrow, the Supreme Court held that the British Crown assumed 
fiduciary obligations to protect First Nations peoples, their rights 
and their lands when it proclaimed the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 
These obligations were passed on to the Federal Government in 
subsection 91 (24) of the Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982. In 
summarizing the nature of these obligations, former Chief Justice 
Dickson stated: 
In our opinion, Guerin together with R. v. Taylor and 
Williams (1981), O.R. (2d) 360, ground a general guid-
ing principle for s. 35(1). That is the Government has the 
responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to 
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Aboriginal peoples. The relationship between the 
Government and Aboriginals is trust-like, rather than ad-
versarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation 
of Aboriginal rights must be defined in light of this his-
toric relationship.79 
As noted earlier, Henderson believed the general principles of 
common law could be applied to protect the rights and interests of 
First Nations and their peoples. However, in the past courts were 
bound by the command theory of law. If a statute abridged com-
mon law rights the courts felt compelled to apply the statute law in 
the appropriate circumstances. Parliament and the legislatures were 
supreme within their respective constitutional jurisdictions. In the 
past, the courts were also caught up in the Canadian belief of their 
cultural and racial superiority to Aboriginal peoples. 
Now the courts are the guardians of the law as set out in the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and should permit no laws to abrogate or 
derogate from Aboriginal rights. If it can be shown that the 
Governments have breached their fiduciary obligations to protect 
Aboriginal peoples and their Aboriginal rights the courts can award 
damages. Damages for breach of fiduciary obligations usually re-
quire that the beneficiaries be put in as good a position as they 
should have been if no breach had occurred. 
When the First Nations of Newfoundland and Labrador mount 
a challenge to the actions of the Federal and Newfoundland 
Governments the spotlight will be on the Newfoundland courts. 
Will the deliberate breaches of Federal fiduciary obligations be 
condoned or condemned? Will the ultra vires agreements be struck 
down or upheld? Will the abrogation and derogation of the 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of First Nations by the Federal and 
Newfoundland Governments be held to be a contravention of sub-
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982? Will the courts order 
the Federal and Newfoundland Governments to provide 
Newfoundland and Labrador First Nations with the opportunity to 
exercise Liberal-like individual rights to determine what their terms 
of union will be? Will the courts be prepared to order vast amounts 
of compensation for the withholding of federal services that First 
Nations peoples in Newfoundland-Labrador should have been re-
79 R. v. Sparrow (1990), 111 N.R. 241 (S.C.C.) at 276. See 271-76 for the full 
development of the summa1y of this principle. 
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ceiving since 1949? Will Henderson's dark theme of Canadian-First 
Nations relations prevail again or will the courts rule against their 
own governments, putting First Nations interests ahead of their 
own? Three quarters of the territory of Newfoundland and 
Labrador are claimed by First Nations. The past governments of 
Newfoundland have never made an attempt to explicitly extinguish 
First Nations Aboriginal or treaty rights. The clash of cultures will 
ring loudly when the First Nations of Newfoundland-Labrador 
challenge the illegal and dishonourable acts of the Federal and 
Newfoundland Governments. 
If the Federal and Newfoundland Governments can be per-
suaded or harassed into rectifying their past acts of colonial oppres-
sion a unique opportunity could materialize. The First Nations of 
Newfoundland-Labrador could become a "pilot project" once again 
in charting a new course for Canadian-First Nations relations. 
Canada and Newfoundland could, for the first time in Canadian 
colonial history, agree to negotiate a treaty of confederation with 
Newfoundland and Labrador First Nations, recognizing their inde-
pendent status as self-governing peoples. 
